CEO Attributes and Firm Performance in the Hospitality Industry by Li, Yuan & Singal, Manisha
Journal of Hospitality Financial Management
The Professional Refereed Journal of the Association of Hospitality Financial
Management Educators
Volume 25 | Issue 2 Article 3
12-15-2017
CEO Attributes and Firm Performance in the
Hospitality Industry
Yuan Li
Department of Hospitality & Tourism Management, Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA
Manisha Singal
Department of Hospitality & Tourism Management, Pamplin College of Business, Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm
This Refereed Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Hospitality Financial Management by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Li, Yuan and Singal, Manisha (2017) "CEO Attributes and Firm Performance in the Hospitality Industry," Journal of Hospitality
Financial Management: Vol. 25 : Iss. 2 , Article 3.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/10913211.2017.1398941
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/jhfm/vol25/iss2/3
CEO Attributes and Firm Performance in the Hospitality Industry
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ABSTRACT
Drawing on upper echelons theory, we explore demographic and other attributes of CEOs in the
hospitality industry and their impact on firm performance. Our results, based on a sample of 1,427
CEO firm-years of publicly traded companies over a period of 24 years, show that a typical CEO in
the hospitality industry is male, in his mid-50s, with no graduate degree and no prior CEO
experience, but has worked in operations and has an average tenure of approximately 9 years.
Our analyses show that while there is some relationship between CEO attributes and firm
performance, the sign and significance of this relationship depends on the specific firm perfor-
mance measure used. Our study contributes to the literature in corporate governance and
hospitality by systematically examining the effect of CEO demographics and other attributes on
firm performance in the hospitality industry. We draw implications for CEO search committees of
hospitality firms and outline avenues for future research.
Chief executive officers (CEOs) play an important
role in making strategic decisions (Porter, 1980),
shaping organizational architecture (Burgelman,
1983), and energizing organizational constituencies
(Fanelli, Misangyi, & Tosi, 2009). Although there are
debates among scholars about how much CEOs
matter, the “CEO effect,” or the influence CEOs
have on firm performance, is well documented in
the literature. A recent study finds that the CEO
effect explains 38.5% of variance in return on assets
(ROA), 35.5% of variance in return on sales, and
46.4% of variance in market-to-book value of com-
mon stock (Hambrick & Quigley, 2014). Moreover,
the CEO effect has increased from less than 10%
during the period of 1950–1969 to about 20% during
the period of 1990–2009 (Quigley & Hambrick,
2015). Despite the increasing significance of CEOs,
limited research has studied their impact on the
financial performance of hospitality firms.
According to upper echelons theory (Hambrick &
Mason, 1984), CEO attributes affect firm perfor-
mance. The financial market reacts when a firm
appoints or dismisses its CEO (Jackson, 2014).
Nevertheless, research on CEO demographics and
experience-related attributes in the hospitality litera-
ture is sparse. Although not directly studying the
impact of CEO attributes on firm performance, a
handful of studies on hospitality executives provide
some evidence of the association between personal
attributes, such as gender (Gröschl & Arcot, 2014)
and tenure (Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014), and firm
performance. More studies are needed to better
understand how CEO attributes affect hospitality
firm performance.
In examining the financial performance of hospi-
tality firms, previous research has used different
measures of firm performance, such as ROA
(Madanoglu & Karadag, 2008), stock return
(Ozdemir, Kizildag, & Upneja, 2013), and Tobin’s Q
(Guillet, Kucukusta, & Xiao, 2012). As an example of
an accounting-based measure of profitability, ROA
reflects the past or short-term financial performance
of a firm, whereas market-based measures, such as
Tobin’s Q and stock return, reflect future or long-
term financial performance of a firm (Combs, Crook,
& Shook, 2005; Hult et al., 2008). Both accounting-
and market-based measures are widely used as valid
indicators of financial performance. Nevertheless,
there is no consensus about the relationship between
the two (Richard, Devinney, Yip, & Johnson, 2009).
While some scholars suggest that they are unrelated
because of the conflicts between achieving long-term
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versus short-term financial goals (Venkatraman &
Ramanujam, 1986), others expect the two to be
more or less associated (Richard et al., 2009). In an
effort to address this ongoing debate, Gentry and
Shen (2010) conducted a study using annual financial
data from all the publicly traded U.S. firms in
Compustat from 1961 to 2008. Their findings indicate
that despite the positive correlation between account-
ing- and market-based measures across industries,
there is no evidence of convergence between the
two. Given that each indicator may represent a dis-
tinct dimension of firm performance, a comparison of
the effects of CEO attributes on different indicators of
firm financial performance is warranted.
To that end, the current study employs upper
echelons theory as a theoretical background to inves-
tigate how CEO attributes affect the performance of
firms in the hospitality industry. Specifically, the
present study aims to examine: (1) the attributes of
CEOs in the hospitality industry and (2) the effect of
CEO attributes on firm performance.
Literature review
The impact of CEOs on firm performance in the
hospitality industry
The impact CEOs have on the performance of firms
has captured extensive attention from scholars and
practitioners alike. At the center of leadership, CEOs
set the pattern for the organization through their
vision, decisions, policies, and the things about
which they care, measure, and reward (Finkelstein,
Hambrick, &Cannella, 2009). Numerous studies have
examined the effect of CEOs on firm performance.
While research findings do not agree on the extent to
which CEOs affect firm performance, Mackey (2008)
finds that, by addressing the methodological issues
behind the inconsistency, CEO effect is considerably
more important than industry effect on corporate-
parent performance, and reasonably more important
than industry effect on business-segment perfor-
mance in certain settings. In lodging/entertainment,
services, wholesale/retail trade, and transportation,
industry effects account for a substantially larger por-
tion of performance variance than in manufacturing
(McGahan & Porter, 1997). Therefore, holding indus-
try effect constant, a study of CEO effect on firm
performance within the hospitality industry is
warranted.
Unlike previous studies on CEOs that are mostly
sector-specific, the current study investigates CEO
effect on firm performance using the hospitality
industry as a whole. The hospitality industry is
unique in several aspects. First, the hospitality indus-
try relies on discretionary income, and therefore is
very sensitive to economic downturns (Denizci,
2007). Second, the hospitality industry pays its
executives lower than other industries do (Skalpe,
2007; Sturman, 2001). Third, the hospitality industry
is structurally different from other industries such
that the hospitality industry has greater competition,
higher risk, higher leverage, and higher capital inten-
sity than other industries, and these characteristics
may help explain why the hospitality industry differs
from other industries with regard to profitability,
stock returns, and corporate governance practices
(Singal, 2015).
CEO attributes and firm performance
Upper echelons theory posits that executive attri-
butes affect executive actions and decision making,
which in turn affect firm performance (Hambrick
& Mason, 1984). Executives are boundedly
rational, as their decisions and actions reflect
their own values, experiences, and personalities
(Hambrick, 2007). Executive demographic attri-
butes are valid, although incomplete, proxies of
their cognitions (Hambrick, 2007). Researchers
can make predictions of firm performance and
strategic decisions based on executives’ age, gen-
der, tenure, experience, educational backgrounds,
and functional backgrounds (Guillet, Seo,
Kucukusta, & Lee, 2013; Hambrick, 2007;
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Based on 308 studies,
Wang, Holmes, Oh, and Zhu (2016) conducted a
meta-analysis and found general support for the
predictions of upper echelons theory, with a few
exceptions. For example, they found that CEO
attributes, including age, tenure, formal education,
and prior career experience, are positively related
to firm performance. The following section pro-
vides a summary of the literature regarding the
aforementioned CEO attributes.
78 Y. LI AND M. SINGAL
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 M
as
sa
ch
us
ett
s, 
Am
he
rst
] a
t 1
4:5
3 2
9 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
7 
Age
According to Guillet et al. (2012), age is an
important variable about executives because
they accrue human capital through years of
work. Older executives may be more competitive
than younger executives because they have more
experience in business (Peni, 2014). Previous
research has found mixed results with regard to
the relationship between executive age and firm
performance. For example, Peni (2014) found
that CEO age is not significantly related to
Tobin’s Q, but is positively related to ROA.
Davidson, Xie, Xu, and Ning (2007) found that
CEOs who are close to retirement age are more
concerned with short-term instead of long-term
firm performance prior to turnover in order to
increase their personal wealth. Davis (1979),
however, found no relationship between execu-
tive age and corporate performance.
Gender
Gender is one of the most studied attributes of
executives (Peni, 2014). Using this attribute as one
of the indicators of good diversity management in
the hospitality industry, Singal (2014) found that
investment in diversity has a positive impact on
the firm’s financial performance, as measured by
Tobin’s Q and firm credit rating. Although earlier
studies suggest that male executives have greater
advantages for business performance than their
female counterparts (Granovetter, 1992), female
CEOs are, on average, younger than male CEOs,
but have more impressive work experience and
education (Adams, Gupta, Haughton, & Leeth,
2007). When the CEO is a woman, the firm has
lower risk levels than when the CEO is a man
(Khan, Walayet, & João Paulo, 2013). Gröschl
and Arcot (2014) explored the composition of
top management teams (TMT) in the hotel indus-
try and found that different proportions of female
executives in a TMT have different impacts on
firm performance. When 10%–20% of TMT mem-
bers are female, female executives have a positve
influence on the firm’s financial performance.
Tenure
CEO tenure refers to the number of years an
individual works as a CEO at the company. As
CEOs accumulate tenure, their knowledge of the
firm and their ability to monitor and provide
important resources increase, which may have a
positive impact on the firm’s financial perfor-
mance (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990). However,
empirical evidence suggests that the tenure–per-
formance relationship is not always linear. For
example, Laveren, Helleboogh, Molly, and Limere
(2010) found a curvilinear relationship between
CEO tenure and firm performance, such that
CEO tenure contributes to firm value growth to a
certain point, after which a longer tenure nega-
tively affects firm value growth. The tenure–per-
formance relationship may also depend on
industry dynamics. For instance, in the stable
food industry, firm performance improves steadily
with CEO tenure, while in the dynamic computer
industry, firm performance decreases steadily with
CEO tenure (Henderson, Miller, & Hambrick,
2006). In the lodging industry, CEO tenure is
significantly related to ROA and Tobin’s Q, but
insignificantly related to stock return (Upneja &
Ozdemir, 2014).
Experience
CEO experience refers to prior CEO experience
before joining the firm. Upper echelons theory
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984) posits that top execu-
tives act on personal interpretations of the situa-
tions they face, and their interpretations are
subject to personal experiences. While experienced
CEOs are hired to replicate their previous success
in the current organizations (Hamori & Koyuncu,
2015), their performance in the new firms is not
always satisfactory. Some studies show that CEO
experience is negatively related to firm perfor-
mance. For example, Elsaid, Wang, and Davidson
(2011) found that companies that hired former
CEOs tend to have worse financial performance
post-succession than companies that hired non-
former CEOs. Yet, the market reacts positively to
the hiring of an experienced outsider. Also, com-
panies that hired former CEOs who moved
directly from their previous positions to the cur-
rent ones, or who have job-specific experience in
the same or related industry or at similar-sized
companies to the current ones, experience signifi-
cantly lower performance post-succession than
companies that hire non-former CEOs (Hamori
& Koyuncu, 2015). Despite the intriguing findings,
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a meta-analysis on upper echelons theory reveals
that CEO prior experience is positively related to
firm performance (Wang et al., 2016).
Educational background
Shareholders believe that some predictions can be
made about a CEO’s thinking process and perfor-
mance based on the type of degree the CEO holds
(Gottesman & Morey, 2010). CEO formal educa-
tion is said to reflect CEO cognitive ability to
acquire and process complex information and to
facilitate decision making (Wally & Baum, 1994).
CEO formal education may also reflect a CEO’s
level of innate curiosity and openness to new ideas
(Wang et al., 2016). Using data from 1987 to 1996
and 1997 to 2006, respectively, Jalbert, Rao, and
Jalbert (2002) and Jalbert, Furumo, and Jalbert
(2011) found limited or mixed evidence regarding
the impact of CEO educational background on
firm performance. Alternatively, Gottesman and
Morey (2010) showed no significant differences
of financial performance among firms managed
by CEOs with or without graduate degrees or
with different types of graduate degrees (MBA,
law, non-MBA, and non-law) from schools of dif-
ferent rankings. Due to a lack of empirical studies
thus far, it is unclear how CEO education is related
to firm performance in the hospitality industry.
Functional background
As one of the most studied demographic attributes
of top executives, functional background affects
how executives define and approach a problem
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). CEOs gain knowledge
and skills in their prior career experiences, and
such experiences affect their preferences and stra-
tegic choices (Wang et al., 2016). Output func-
tional backgrounds refer to positions in sales and
marketing (Elsaid et al., 2011). Throughput func-
tional backgrounds refer to positions in engineer-
ing, operations, and research and development
(R&D; Elsaid et al., 2011). Peripheral functional
backgrounds refer to positions in accounting,
finance, law, personnel, and general administra-
tion (Bunderson, 2003; Elsaid et al., 2011).
Koyuncu, Firfiray, Claes, and Hamori (2010)
found that CEOs with functional backgrounds in
operations perform better than CEOs with func-
tional backgrounds in finance.
To summarize, research on CEO attributes in the
hospitality industry is scant. Although a handful of
earlier studies have explored the attributes and beha-
vior of top chain-restaurant CEOs (Muller & Inman,
1996), attributes of female restaurant executives
(Petrick, 1998), and the hospitality leadership profile
in America (Lee, 1994), little is known about recent
hospitality CEO attributes and how these attributes
affect firm performance. Drawing on upper echelons
theory, the current study aims to empirically answer
two research questions:
Research Question 1: What are some of the
salient demographic and other attributes of CEOs
in the hospitality industry?
Research Question 2: How do these CEO attri-
butes affect firm performance in the hospitality
industry?
Figure 1 presents the conceptual framework
proposed by the current study.
Methodology
Data
We obtained data from Compustat, ExecuComp,
Marquis’ Who’s Who, and Bloomberg Executive
Profiles for the period of 1992–2015. In order to
gather all data related to hospitality CEOs in
Figure 1. Firm performance model in the hospitality industry.
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ExecuComp, we started with identifying a list of 42
North American Industry Classification System
(NAICS) codes associated with the hospitality indus-
try via a keyword search (i.e., hotel, restaurant,
cruise, theme park, air transportation, travel, accom-
modation, beverage, parks, and club) and on the
official NAICS site (www.census.gov/eos/www/
naics). Using this list as search criteria for publicly
traded hospitality companies in North America, a
subset of 156 Compustat companies that are avail-
able in ExecuComp was identified for further study.
After manually screening for unrelated companies
based on company description, the final sample con-
sisted of 1,427 firm-years, 240 distinct CEOs, and
106 unique companies. All financial data were win-
sorized at 5% and 95% levels to moderate the effects
of extreme values and their impact on regression
coefficients.
Independent variables
The main independent variable in this study is CEO
attributes, which have six components: age, gender,
tenure, experience, educational background, and
functional background. The data for CEO age, gender,
and tenure were collected from ExecuComp. Age is
measured as a CEO’s age in the fiscal year studied,
gender as a dummy variable with 1 being male and 0
being female, and tenure as a CEO’s years of employ-
ment as CEO at the focal firm. For each of the CEOs
within the dataset, we manually extracted CEO
experience, educational background, and functional
background information from Marquis’ Who’s Who
and Bloomberg Executive Profiles. CEO experience
consists of four dummy variables, following a scheme
partially adapted from Hamori and Koyuncu (2015).
Exp1 equals 1 if the CEO has no prior CEO experi-
ence, and 0 otherwise. Exp2 equals 1 if the CEO has
prior CEO experience in the same industry as the
focal firm, and 0 otherwise. Exp3 equals 1 if the
CEOhas prior CEO experience in other service indus-
tries, and 0 otherwise. Exp4 equals 1 if the CEO has
prior CEO experience in manufacturing industries,
and 0 otherwise. Similar to experience, educational
background also consists of four dummy variables
(Gottesman & Morey, 2010). Edu1 equals 1 if the
CEO has a non-graduate degree, and 0 otherwise.
Edu2 equals 1 if the CEO has an MBA, and 0 other-
wise. Edu3 equals 1 if the CEO has a graduate degree
in law, and 0 otherwise. Edu4 equals 1 if the CEO has
a non-MBA and non-law graduate degree, and 0
otherwise. For functional background, Fun1 equals 1
if the CEO has a sales andmarketing background, and
0 otherwise. Fun2 equals 1 if the CEO has an engi-
neering, operations, or R&D background, and 0
otherwise. Fun3 equals 1 if the CEO has an account-
ing, finance, law, personnel, or general administration
background (Bunderson, 2003; Elsaid et al., 2011).
CEO functional backgrounds were determined by
examining each CEO’s prior job titles, employment
history (Elsaid, 2014), and dominant functional career
track based on length of service (Michel & Hambrick,
1992).
Dependent variables
The dependent variable in this study is firm perfor-
mance, which has three indicators: ROA, Tobin’s Q,
and stock return. ROA is operationalized as the ratio
of net income to average total assets (Upneja &
Ozdemir, 2014). Tobin’s Q is operationalized as the
approximate q using Chung and Pruitt’s (1994) calcu-
lation (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA, where MVE repre-
sents the product of a firm’s stock price and the
number of common shares outstanding; PS represents
the liquidating value of outstanding preferred shares;
DEBT represents the value of short-term liabilities,
net of short-term assets plus the book value of long-
term assets; and TA represents the book value of total
assets. Stock return is calculated as the ratio of the
difference between the fiscal year-end closing price of
year t and year t-1 plus dividends to the fiscal year-end
closing price of year t-1 (Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014).
Control variables
Firm size, leverage, CEO change, duality, and year
are included as control variables for the statistical
analyses because earlier research suggests that these
variables may influence firm performance (Guillet
et al., 2013; Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014). Size is oper-
ationalized as the natural logarithm of total assets,
leverage as the ratio of total debt to total assets, CEO
change as a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1
if a new CEO assumes office in year t relative to year
t-1, and 0 otherwise. Duality refers to a CEO who is
also chair of the board and is measured by a dummy
variable that takes on a value of 1 if the CEO is also
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chair of the board, and 0 otherwise. Data of control
variables were collected from Compustat and
ExecuComp. Table 1 lists the descriptions, data
sources, and citations of the variables in the study.
Data analysis
The current study uses OLS to analyze the effect of
CEO attributes on firm performance. The data
analysis consists of two steps: Model 1 examines
the effect of control variables on firm performance
and Model 2 examines the effect of CEO attributes
and control variables on firm performance. The
general model estimated is as follows, with Exp1,
Edu1, and Fun2 omitted to avoid the dummy
variable trap:
ROAi;t=Tobin
0
sQi;t=Stockreturni;t¼β0þβ1Agei;t
þβ2Genderi;tþβ3Tenurei;tþβ4Exp2i;tþβ5Exp3i;tþβ6Exp4i;t
þβ7Edu2i;tþβ8Edu3i;tþβ9Edu4i;tþβ10Fun1i;tþβ11Fun3i;t
þβ12Sizei;tþβ13Leveragei;tþβ14CEOchangei;tþβ15Dualityi;t
þD:Yearþ ε
Results
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 displays the summary statistics of the vari-
ables examined in this study. The average ROA of
the sample firms is 5%, the average Tobin’s Q is 1.51,
and the average annual stock return is 9%. A typical
firm in our sample has $4,577.44 million worth of
total assets and a leverage ratio of 0.62. On average, a
Table 1. Descriptions, Data Sources, and Citations of Variables in the Study.
Variables Descriptions Data Sources Citations
Agei,t CEO’s age for firm i at year t ExecuComp (Guillet et al.,
2012)
Genderi,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO is male, 0 if female ExecuComp (Guillet et al.,
2012)
Tenurei,t CEO’s years of employment as CEO at firm i at year t ExecuComp (Guillet et al.,
2012)
Exp1i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has no prior CEO experience, 0 otherwise Marquis’ Who’s Who,
Bloomberg Executive
Profiles
(Hamori &
Koyuncu, 2015)Exp2i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has prior CEO experience in the same
industry as firm i, 0 otherwise
Exp3i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has prior CEO experience in other service
industries, 0 otherwise
Exp4i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has prior CEO experience in manufacturing
industries, 0 otherwise
Edu1i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has a non-graduate degree, 0 otherwise Marquis’ Who’s Who,
Bloomberg Executive
Profiles
(Gottesman &
Morey, 2010)Edu2i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has an MBA, 0 otherwise
Edu3i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has a graduate degree in law, 0 otherwise
Edu4i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has a non-MBA and non-law graduate
degree, 0 otherwise
Fun1i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has an output functional background, 0
otherwise
Marquis’ Who’s Who,
Bloomberg Executive
Profiles
(Bunderson, 2003;
Elsaid et al., 2011)
Fun2i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has a throughput functional background, 0
otherwise
Fun3i,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO has a peripheral functional background, 0
otherwise
ROAi,t Ratio of net income and average total assets Compustat (Upneja &
Ozdemir, 2014)
Tobin’s Qi,t Approximate q = (MVE + PS + DEBT)/TA, where MVE is the product of a firm’s
stock price and the number of common shares outstanding; PS is the
liquidating value of outstanding preferred shares; DEBT is the value of short-
term liabilities, net of short-term assets plus the book value of long-term
assets; and TA is the book value of total assets
Compustat (Chung & Pruitt,
1994)
Stock returni,t The ratio of the difference between the fiscal year-end closing price of year t
and year t-1 plus dividends to the fiscal year-end closing price of year t-1
Compustat (Upneja &
Ozdemir, 2014)
Sizei,t Natural logarithm of total assets Compustat (Upneja &
Ozdemir, 2014)
Leveragei,t Ratio of total debt and total assets Compustat (Guillet et al.,
2013)
CEO changei,t Dummy variable = 1 if a new CEO assumes office in year t relative to year t-1,
0 otherwise
ExecuComp (Upneja &
Ozdemir, 2014)
Dualityi,t Dummy variable = 1 if the CEO is also chair of the board, 0 otherwise ExecuComp (Guillet et al.,
2013)
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sample firm has experienced CEO change at least
once during the sample period. The average age of
the sample CEOs is around 54 years, with the young-
est CEO being 30 years old and the oldest being
80 years old. Male CEOs constitute the majority
(96.8%). Among the sample CEOs, 70.7% have no
prior CEO experience, 20.8% have CEO experience
in the same industry as the focal firm, 5.3% have
CEO experience in other service industries, and 3.2%
have CEO experience in themanufacturing industry.
In terms of education, 52.1% of the sample CEOs
have no graduate degrees, 27.7% have an MBA
degree, 14.2% have an advanced law degree, and
6.0% have a graduate degree in other fields. As for
functional background, 61.2% of the sample CEOs
have worked in operations, 29.8% have worked in
fields related to accounting, finance, law, personnel,
and general administration, and 9.0% have worked
in fields related to sales and marketing. The majority
(67.6%) of the sample CEOs also serve as chair of the
board. Table 3 lists the results of Pearson’s correla-
tion analysis of the variables in this study. ROA,
Tobin’s Q, and stock return are positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with each other. Among the
four control variables, CEO change is negatively
and significantly correlated with all three perfor-
mance measures.
Empirical findings
Research question 2 asks about the relationship
between CEO attributes and firm performance.
Two general models were analyzed, one with
only control variables as independent variables
and the other with both CEO attributes and
control variables as independent variables. As
shown in Models 1 a/b/c of Table 4, control
variables have varying effects on firm perfor-
mance such that size, leverage, CEO change,
and duality all have a significant impact on
ROA, whereas only size has a significant impact
on Tobin’s Q and no control variable has a
significant impact on stock return. When CEO
attributes are added to the model, gender and
Exp2 have a significant, negative effect on ROA
(Model 2a). In other words, male CEOs and
CEOs with prior CEO experience in the same
industry underperform female CEOs and CEOs
in other experience categories in terms of ROA.
As shown in Model 2b, age, Exp4, Edu4, and
Fun3 have a significant effect on Tobin’s Q.
Specifically, Tobin’s Q decreases as CEO age
increases. Compared with other CEOs, CEOs
with prior CEO experience in manufacturing
industries, CEOs with non-MBA and non-law
graduate degrees, and CEOs with functional
backgrounds in accounting, finance, law, person-
nel, and general administration are associated
with lower levels of Tobin’s Q. As shown in
Model 2c, age is positively and significantly
related to stock return. Overall, tenure has no
significant impact on firm performance regard-
less of the performance measure used. Also, the
signs of the coefficients of gender are negative
across models, suggesting that female CEOs con-
sistently outperform male CEOs. However, given
that female CEOs constitute less than 4% of the
sample, this result should be interpreted with
caution. Taken together, the answer to our sec-
ond research question is that while there is some
relationship between CEO attributes and firm
performance, the sign and significance of this
relationship depends on the specific firm perfor-
mance measure used, and there are no identify-
ing attributes that consistently lead to superior
firm performance across all metrics.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable N Mean SD Min. Max.
ROA 1381 0.05 0.06 −0.10 0.16
Tobin’s Q 1360 1.51 0.86 0.51 3.70
Stock return 1281 0.09 0.41 −0.58 0.96
Age 1427 54.36 7.62 30.00 80.00
Tenure (in years) 1406 8.73 7.93 0.10 41.00
Size (in millions) 1388 4577.44 8084.21 6.27 54121.00
Leverage 1388 0.62 0.37 0.04 4.07
Frequency (%)
N 1 0
Gender 1427 1381 (96.8) 46 (3.2)
Exp1 1415 1001 (70.7) 414 (29.3)
Exp2 1415 294 (20.8) 1121 (79.2)
Exp3 1415 75 (5.3) 1347 (94.7)
Exp4 1415 45 (3.2) 1370 (96.8)
Edu1 1243 647 (52.1) 596 (47.9)
Edu2 1243 344 (27.7) 899 (72.3)
Edu3 1243 177 (14.2) 1066 (85.8)
Edu4 1243 75 (6.0) 1168 (94.0)
Fun1 1414 127 (9.0) 1287 (91.0)
Fun2 1414 866 (61.2) 548 (38.8)
Fun3 1414 421 (29.8) 993 (70.2)
CEO change 1422 137 (9.6) 1285 (90.4)
Duality 1427 965 (67.6) 462 (32.4)
Note: Please refer to Table 1 for description of variables.
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Discussion
Although organizational theorists suggest that CEO
attributes may affect firm performance, empirical
evidence is far from conclusive. Given that CEO
attributes are understudied in the hospitality litera-
ture, we systematically analyzed the effect of CEO
attributes on three of the most commonly used firm
performance indicators: ROA, Tobin’s Q, and stock
return. Drawing on upper echelons theory and
extensive hand-collected data on CEOs of publicly
traded hospitality firms, the present research empiri-
cally finds that a typical CEO in the hospitality
industry is a man, in his mid-50s, who has no grad-
uate degree and no prior CEO experience, but has
worked in operations and has a CEO tenure of
approximately nine years. Second, out of the six
attributes variables, only tenure does not have a
significant impact on firm performance. Age, experi-
ence, educational background, and functional back-
ground all have a significant impact on firm
performance, measured as Tobin’s Q. Several impor-
tant theoretical and managerial implications can be
drawn from this research.
Theoretical implications
Drawing on upper echelons theory (Hambrick
& Mason, 1984), to the best of our knowledge, the
current research is the first to systematically assess the
effect of CEO attributes, particularly experience, edu-
cation, and functional background, on firm perfor-
mance. As predicted by the theory, age, gender, and
tenure are significantly correlated with firm perfor-
mance. However, tenure has no significant impact on
any of the three firm performance measures, control-
ling for the effects of other CEO attributes and control
variables. The finding is contrary to previous findings
in the restaurant (Guillet et al., 2013) and hotel settings
(Upneja & Ozdemir, 2014). One possible explanation
is that there are subsector differences within the hos-
pitality industry. For example, airlines and casinos
may be different from hotels and restaurants in
terms of average firm size and sensitivity to govern-
mental policies. Given that industry dynamics affect
the direction of the tenure–firmperformance relation-
ship (Henderson et al., 2006), the nonsignificant result
in our study should not be surprising. Future research
can replicate the current study in different hospitality
sectors and compare the results to this study. Another
explanation is that the relationship between tenure
and firm performance is nonlinear (Laveren et al.,
2010) and indirect (Wang et al., 2016). For example,
future strategic actions mediate the relationship
between CEO attributes and firm performance
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Thus, the current study
echoes Wang et al.’s (2016) call for theoretical and
Table 4. Results of OLS Estimation.
ROA Tobin’s Q Stock Return
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b Model 1c Model 2c
β β β β β β
Age .000 −.007* .004**
Gender −.026* −.275 −.099
Tenure .000 .007 −.003
Exp2 −.010* −.041 −.049
Exp3 −.005 .155 −.043
Exp4 −.019 −.300* −.075
Edu2 .000 −.075 .019
Edu3 .001 .056 .005
Edu4 −.004 −.233* .071
Fun1 .001 −.078 −.017
Fun3 −.007 −.187** .010
Size −.007*** −.006*** −.151*** −.124*** −.005 −.007
Leverage −.031*** −.029*** −.085 −.069 .001 .001
CEO change −.019** −.018** −.070 −.063 −.046 −.046
Duality .008* .004 .068 .039 −.010 .000
F-statistic 6.390*** 5.267*** 6.279*** 5.381*** 12.720*** 9.455***
Adj. R2 0.109 0.120 0.109 0.125 0.226 0.228
N 1186 1186 1167 1167 1087 1087
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Note: Coefficients of year dummies are not reported for clarity and brevity. Please refer to Table 1 for descriptions of variables.
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empirical research to identify additional mediators of
the CEO attributes–firm performance relationship.
One important finding of this study is that CEO
experience, education, and functional background
are significantly related to firm performance in
terms of Tobin’s Q. Few studies have explicitly
examined the effect of experience, education, and
functional background on firm performance in the
hospitality industry. Because the hospitality industry
values hands-on experience and is famous for its
legendary entrepreneurs, such as J. W. Marriott
and Conrad Hilton, there can be a perception that
advanced degrees are not necessary for the success of
the hospitality business. To some extent, the findings
of this study confirm this notion by showing that
CEOs with a graduate degree do not outperform
CEOs who do not have an advanced degree.
Nevertheless, the current study does not suggest
that higher education is irrelevant to the hospitality
business. In a 1996 survey, 57 women executives in
48multiunit restaurant firms indicated that advance-
ment to the rank of an executive position in the
industry was no longer possible without formal edu-
cation (Petrick, 1998). The results also reveal that
CEOs who have graduate degrees other than MBA
and law underperform CEOs who do not have
advanced degrees. This finding seems to suggest
that all (graduate) degrees are not the same, which
can be supported by Hambrick and Mason’s (1984)
argument that it is reasonable to believe that students
pursuing an English-literature degree are somewhat
different from students pursuing a business degree.
In addition, the finding on functional background
suggests that CEOs who have a throughput back-
ground, whether it is related to their experience as a
chief operating officer (COO), a restaurant franchi-
see, or a hotel manager, outperform CEOs who have
other functional backgrounds in areas such as law,
finance, and accounting. Since it is reasonable to
believe that the hospitality business accentuates
operations experience, the finding is consistent
with upper echelons theory’s prediction that the
degree of throughout functional experience of execu-
tives is positively related to the extent to which the
firm emphasizes throughout in its strategy
(Hambrick & Mason, 1984). The finding also con-
firms what 85 restaurant CEOs in 1996 revealed as
critical human resources factors for success in the
consumer-driven service industry: operations and
field-management experience and skills (Muller &
Inman, 1996). Lastly, the findings suggest that CEOs
who rise through the ranks fromwithin the company
or who have no prior CEO experience outside the
company outperform CEOs with prior experience.
Specifically, CEOs with prior experience as CEOs in
manufacturing companies significantly underper-
form CEOs who have no prior experience. The find-
ing implies that not all CEOs’ job-specific knowledge
or skills are transferable across industries. What
works in the manufacturing industry may not work
in the service industry.
This study also contributes to the literature by
empirically demonstrating that the same CEO
attribute variables can have varying effects on dif-
ferent firm performance measures. Gentry and
Shen (2010) caution that “many authors discuss
firm performance very generally in their theory
and hypothesis development and elaborate on the-
ory performance measures only in the method
section” (p. 526). Given that different measures
of firm performance may represent different
dimensions of a firm, researchers should define
the firm performance measure they want to study
upfront and use it to guide the theoretical devel-
opment (Gentry & Shen, 2010). By doing so,
researchers may develop better theories and avoid
overgeneralizing research findings.
Practical implications
The current study provides some insights for CEO
search committees of hospitality firms. The search
committee can refer to the findings when creating
search criteria for CEO positions that match the
skills, knowledge, and experience of the CEO to
the need of the firm. For the results to be most
beneficial to the search committee, the search
committee has to first decide the main goal they
would like the CEO to achieve and how to mea-
sure the achievement of the goal. If the goal is to
enhance growth outlook measured by Tobin’s Q,
the search committee should give preference to
CEO candidates who are relatively young and
who have operations backgrounds. The search
committee should also give preference to CEO
candidates who do not come from CEO positions
from manufacturing firms. Although it is often
assumed that individuals who have advanced
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degrees are more likely to succeed as CEOs, this
research shows that advanced degrees other than
MBA and law may not help CEOs excel in the
hospitality industry. If the goal the CEO is
expected to achieve is to improve management
efficiency measured by ROA, the search committee
should give preference to female candidates and
candidates who do not come from CEO positions
from other firms in the same industry. If the goal
set for the CEO is to increase stock returns, the
search committee should consider hiring older
CEOs. When a specific goal is not defined, a gen-
eral suggestion is that the search committee should
consider female CEO candidates and candidates
from within the company.
Limitations and future research
The current study has several limitations. First, the
sample is comprised of only publicly traded compa-
nies in the United States. Therefore, the results may
not be generalizable to private firms or the hospital-
ity industry in other contexts. Future research may
replicate the current study using samples from other
countries and compare the results to the findings of
this study. Given that certain firm performance indi-
cators, such as stock return, are not available in
private companies, it will be interesting to see how
private-company CEO attributes are related to firm
performance. Third, there are other factors, such as
CEO compensation, that may affect the firm perfor-
mance examined in this study. Future research
should explore the effects of other variables, sepa-
rately from and/or in conjunction with CEO attri-
butes, on firm performance.
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